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Objective: The aim of this study was to empirically 
assess the efficacy of cognitive countermeasures based on 
the technique of information removal to enhance human 
operator attentional disengagement abilities when facing 
attentional tunneling.
Background: Lessons learned from human factors 
studies suggest that conflict with automation leads to 
the degradation of operators’ performance by promoting 
excessive focusing on a single task to the detriment of the 
supervision of other critical parameters.
Method: An experimental setup composed of a real 
unmanned ground vehicle and a ground station was developed 
to test the efficiency of the cognitive countermeasures. The 
scenario (with and without countermeasure) involved an 
authority conflict between the participants and the robot 
induced by a battery failure. The effects of the conflict and, in 
particular, the impact of cognitive countermeasures on the 
participants’ cognition and arousal were assessed through 
heart rate measurement and eye tracking techniques.
Results: In the control group (i.e., no countermeasure), 
8 out of 12 participants experienced attentional tunneling 
when facing the conflict, leading them to neglect the visual 
alarms displayed that would have helped them to understand 
the evolution of the tactical situation. Participants in the 
countermeasure group showed lower heart rates and 
enhanced attentional abilities, and 10 out of 11 participants 
made appropriate decisions.
Conclusions: The use of cognitive countermeasures 
appeared to be an efficient means to mitigate excessive focus 
issues in the unmanned ground vehicle environment.
Applications: The principle of cognitive counter- 
measures can be applied to a large domain of applications 
involving human operators interacting with critical systems.
Keywords: assistant system, attentional tunneling, alarm 
misperception, conflict, automation, eye tracking, psycho-
physiological measurement, unmanned vehicle
INTRODUCTION
There is a growing interest in unmanned 
vehicles (UVs) for civilian or military applica-
tions, as they prevent the exposure of human 
operators to hazardous situations. In these 
domains, automation is crucial because the 
human operator is not embedded within the sys-
tem (Tvaryanas, 2004), and hazardous events 
may interfere with human-robot interactions 
(e.g., communication breakdown and latencies). 
The design of authority sharing is therefore criti-
cal (Inagaki, 2003) because conflict between the 
robot and human operator could seriously com-
promise mission success (Parasuraman & 
Wickens, 2008; Van Ginkel, de Vries, Koeners, 
& Theunissen, 2006). Such problems have moti-
vated researchers (Meyer, 2001; Parasuraman & 
Wickens, 2008; Rice, 2009) to study imperfect 
diagnostic automation (i.e., miss-prone vs. false 
alarm–prone automation). Unreliable diagnostic 
automation has been shown to negatively affect 
attentional resources (Wickens, Dixon, Goh, & 
Hammer, 2005) and to degrade global human 
operator performance (Dixon, Wickens, & 
McCarley, 2007; Wickens & Dixon, 2007).
Interestingly, these findings are consistent 
with research in aviation psychology whereby 
crew-automation conflicts known as automation 
surprises (Sarter & Woods, 1995; Sarter, Woods, 
& Billings, 1997) occur when the autopilot does 
not behave as expected. These situations can lead 
to accidents with an airworthy airplane if, despite 
the presence of auditory warnings (Beringer 
& Harris, 1999), the crew persists with solving 
a minor conflict (Billings, 1996) “instead of 
switching to another means or a more direct 
means to accomplish their flight path manage-
ment goals” (Woods & Sarter, 2000, p. 347). 
Flight simulator experiments demonstrate that in 
cases of cognitive conflict with mission manage-
ment systems, human operators’ attentional 
resources are almost exclusively engaged in 
solving the conflict (Dehais, Tessier, & Chaudron, 
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2003) to the extent that critical information, such 
as visual or auditory alarms, are neglected 
(Dehais, Tessier, Christophe, & Reuzeau, 2010), 
a phenomenon known as attentional tunneling 
(Wickens & Alexander, 2009).
Attentional impairment thus presents interface 
designers with a paradox: How can one expect to 
“cure” human operators from attentional tunnel-
ing if the alarms or systems designed to warn 
them are neglected? One solution is to consider 
Posner and Dehaene’s (1994) theory of attention 
by which cognitive countermeasures can be 
designed as a means to mitigate such cognitive 
bias. Posner and Dehaene postulate that selective 
attentional processes are carried out by three dis-
tinct attentional networks: alerting, executive 
control, and orienting. The alerting network 
relates to sustained attention in response to a 
stimulus, the executive control network is engaged 
in activities that involve planning and decision 
making (Posner & Fan, 2007; see also Packwood, 
Hodgetts, & Tremblay, 2011, and the 
orienting network has been associated with disen-
gaging, shifting, and reengaging attention.
There is evidence that impairment of the ori-
enting network, induced by stressors (Pecher, 
Quaireau, Lemercier, & Cellier, 2010), may cause 
attentional neglect. Moreover, orienting visual 
attention (Posner & Dehaene, 1994) has been 
defined as disengaging, shifting, and reengaging 
attention. Experimentation conducted in a flight 
simulator showed that the absence of response to 
either auditory or visual alarms may be explained 
by an inability to disengage attention: The warn-
ing systems are based on providing the operator 
with additional information, but this information 
is of little use if the warning system is not also 
efficient at disengaging attention from the current 
task (Dehais et al., 2003). In contrast, the princi-
ple of cognitive countermeasures relies on the 
temporary removal of information on which the 
human operator is focusing for it to be replaced 
by an explicit visual stimulus to change the atten-
tional focus. The user interface acts as a cognitive 
prosthesis as it performs the attentional disen-
gagement and attentional shifting.
Present Study
The main objective of this study was to assess 
the efficiency of a cognitive countermeasure to 
assist the human operator when facing conflicts 
with highly automated systems. The domain of 
UV–human operator interactions was chosen to 
test this principle, as it offers a generic frame-
work to study conflict with automation. 
Moreover, compared with aviation or nuclear 
power plants, this domain is relatively recent 
and research is sparse.
The experimental setup involved an unmanned 
ground vehicle (UGV), a ground station, and a 
computer interface dedicated to triggering spe-
cial hazards within the scenario. It was necessary 
for the experimenter to initiate the major failures 
at the appropriate time from “behind the scenes,” 
as the robot could be driven at different speeds, 
meaning that scenarios for each participant 
would unfold at a different rate. A scenario was 
designed so that an authority conflict was induced 
by a low-battery event at a point when partici-
pants were deeply involved in a target identifica-
tion task. This hazard led to a safety procedure 
that allowed the robot to return to base autono-
mously. Three visual alerts were displayed on the 
user interface to warn the participants of the 
development of the situation. The visual modal-
ity was chosen because we aimed to understand 
the effects of conflicts and cognitive counter-
measures on visual attention and on disengage-
ment abilities in particular.
One prediction is that the occurrence of this 
typical automation-surprise scenario would 
induce stress and lead the participants to atten-
tional tunneling on the identification task without 
understanding the automation logic. According 
to the literature, such an excessive focus is asso-
ciated with decreased saccadic activity, long con-
centrated eye fixations (Cowen, Ball, & Delin, 
2002; Tsai,Viirre, Strychacz, Chase, & Jung, 
2007), and fewer scanned areas of interest on the 
user interface (Thomas & Wickens, 2004).
Three types of measurements served to assess 
the efficiency of the cognitive countermeasure. 
First, decision making at the time of the failure 
was examined, as it was necessary to ensure that 
participants had detected the failure and under-
stood the robot behavior by letting it go back to 
base. Second, participants’ ocular activity was 
recorded to ensure that attentional shrinking was 
mitigated, as indicated by increased saccadic 
activity and a greater number of scanned areas of 
 interest. Finally, heart rate (HR) was also mea-
sured to establish whether sympathetic activity is 
reduced because of the countermeasure, thus 
suggesting less psychological stress and less 
mobilization of mental resources to deal with the 
situation (Causse, Sénard, Démonet, & Pastor, 
2010).
METHOD
Participants
For this study, 23 healthy participants (mean 
age = 29.52 years, SD = 9.14), all French 
defense staff from Institut Supérieur de 
l’Aéronautique et de l’Espace (ISAE) and from 
Office Nationale d’Etude et de Recherche 
Aérospatiale, were recruited by local advertise-
ment (mean level of education = 17.43 years, 
SD = 2.23). Participants gave their informed 
consent after receiving complete information 
about the nature of the experiment. Participants 
were randomly assigned into two independent 
groups: control and countermeasure.
The control group consisted of 12 partici-
pants (mean age = 28.25, SD = 6.64; mean level 
of education = 17.41, SD = 2.27) for whom no 
countermeasure was used to solve the conflict 
when the battery failure occurred.
The countermeasure group acted as the 
experimental group and consisted of 11 partici-
pants (mean age = 30.90, SD = 11.45; mean 
level of education = 17.45, SD = 2.30) for whom 
the countermeasure was administered to help 
solving the conflict at the time of the battery 
failure.1
Experimental Design
The experimental setup, developed at ISAE, 
was composed of a UGV and a ground station to 
interact with the robot. The UGV (see Figure 1) 
was equipped with two microprocessors, an 
embedded real-time Linux, a wireless Internet 
module, a high-frequency emitter, and a set of 
sensors (a GPS module, an inertial central, 
ultrasound sensors, a panoramic camera, and an 
odometer). The UGV could be operated in 
“manual mode” or in “supervised mode.” In 
manual mode, the UGV was manually con-
trolled by the human operator with a joystick. 
In supervised mode, the UGV performed way-
point navigation, but any actions made with the 
joystick allowed the human operator to take 
over until the stick was released.
The ground station (see Figure 1) was dis-
played on a 24-inch screen and offered different 
information to control and to supervise the 
UGV: (a) a panoramic video scene screen 
placed in the upper part of the graphic user 
interface (GUI); (b) a panel that states the cur-
rent segment of the mission in green (e.g., 
“search target”) below the panoramic video; (c) 
a Google map, in the lower left corner, display-
ing the tactical map and the position of the 
robot; (d) an interactive panel sending messages 
and requests; (e) a “health” panel indicating the 
status of the robot (GPS status, ultrasound sta-
tus, and battery level); and (f) a mode annuncia-
tor (supervised vs. manual).
Experimental Scenario
The scenario consisted of a target localiza-
tion and identification task. The target was 
made of black metal with red stripes (length = 
1 m, height = 80 cm) and two short messages 
written in white on each side (front side, “OK”; 
back side, “KO”). The camera scene of the 
robot needed to be placed at 1.5 m maximum 
from the target to read the message.
The mission lasted approximately 4 min and 
was segregated into four main segments: S1, 
“Reach the area”; S2, “Scan for target”; S3, 
“Identify target”; and S4, “Battery failure.” At 
the beginning of the mission, the UGV navigated 
in supervised mode to reach the search area (S1). 
After arrival, it then started scanning to detect the 
target (S2). When the robot was in the vicinity of 
the target, a message was sent to the human oper-
ator to take over and to control the UGV in man-
ual mode so as to identify possible similarities in 
the two messages (“OK” and “KO”) written on 
each side of the target (S3). While the human 
operator was involved in the identification task, a 
“low-battery event” was then sent out by the 
experimenter (S4). In turn, this event led to a 
safety procedure that allowed the robot to return 
to base in supervised mode.
As this failure happened at a crucial moment 
in the mission, when the human operator was 
handling the robot near the target, we expected 
that this event would create an authority con-
flict between the human’s goal, to identify the 
 target, and the robot’s goal, to return to base. 
Moreover, we hypothesized that the human 
operator would not notice the alerts on the inter-
face dedicated to warning of the low-battery 
event.
Failure and Cognitive 
Countermeasure
As mentioned in the previous section, the 
low-battery event triggered an automatic proce-
dure that let the UGV take over and go back to 
base by the shortest route. The human operator 
was informed of the occurrence of this event by 
three main changes in the user interface (see 
Figure 2): (a) The battery icon was turned to 
orange and a Low battery message was dis-
played below it; (b) the new guidance mode, 
Supervised, was flashed twice; and (c) the seg-
ment status evolved from “Search target” to 
“Back to base.”
A cognitive countermeasure (see Figure 3) 
was designed to help the human operators in the 
countermeasure group to deal with the conflict. 
As it was hypothesized that operators would be 
excessively focused on the part of the pan-
oramic video screen for target identification, we 
removed this part for 1 s, sending thereafter 
the explanation of the robot behavior for another 
3 s. After, the panoramic video screen was 
displayed again with the conflict explanation 
information superimposed for 3 s before it dis-
appeared. The robot was stopped while the cog-
nitive countermeasure was sent.
Psychophysiological Measurement 
and Oculometry
Cardiac and ocular activities were recorded 
during the four segments of the mission. An 
electrocardiogram (ECG) was used to collect 
the participants’ cardiac activity at a sampling 
rate of 2,048 Hz with the ProComp Infinity 
system (Thought TechnoloJ\. 
We applied three electrodes connected to an 
extender cable to the participant’s chest using 
Uni-Gel to enhance the quality of the signal. 
The BioGraph Infiniti software was used to 
export and filter the HR derived from the inter-
beat interval. Because of a commonly observed 
difference in HR baseline values among par-
ticipants, HR values were then standardized to 
provide interparticipant comparison. We 
recorded HR values at rest for 3 min while par-
ticipants were sitting in a comfortable chair 
without any stimulation. The mean HR of the 
resting period was subtracted from the mean 
HR calculated for each of the four segments of 
the mission. This data reduction provided the 
mean HR change for each segment.
Figure 1. The left panel shows the unmanned ground vehicle developed at Institut Supérieur de l’Aéronautique 
et de l’Espace, and the right panel displays the user interface dedicated to control and to supervise the robot. 
The critical parts of the graphic user interface are labeled: (1) panoramic video scene screen, (2) synoptic, (3) 
tactical map, (4) interactive panel, (5) “health” panel, and (6) mode annunciator.
 In parallel, a Pertech head-mounted eye 
tracker was used to analyze the participants’ 
ocular behavior. This device has 0.25° of accu-
racy and a 25-Hz sampling rate. Dedicated soft-
ware (EyeTechLab) provides data, such as time 
stamps and the x- and y-coordinates of the par-
ticipants’ eye gaze on the visual scene. Eight 
areas of interest (AOIs) on the user interface 
were defined as follows: (a) tactical map, (b) 
interactive panel, (c) mode annunciator, (d) 
mission segment panel, (e) back to base, (f) 
GPS and ultrasound status, (g) battery status, 
and (h) panoramic video. We considered a ninth 
AOI to collect the ocular fixations out of the 
previous eight. We considered different oculo-
metric variables (Duchowski, 2007) to assess 
Figure 2. The upper panel shows the graphical user interface (GUI) before the failure, and the bottom panel 
displays the GUI with the low-battery event: The mission segment changes from “Search target” to “Back 
to base,” the battery icon turns from green to orange with an associated message, and the message on the 
interactive panel disappears.
Figure 3. These four panels respectively represent the four steps of the cognitive countermeasure dedicated to 
disengage the human operator’s attention focus from the panoramic video and to enhance his or her situation 
awareness. Top left panel, Step 1: The panoramic video was removed for 1 s. Top right panel, Step 2: The 
relevant information to understand the behavior of the robot was placed in the human operator visual field 
for 3 s. Bottom left panel, Step 3: The video panoramic screen reappeared with the relevant information 
superimposed on it for 3 more seconds. Bottom right panel, Step 4: End of the cognitive countermeasure. Note 
that the robot was stopped while the cognitive countermeasure was triggered.
 the effect of the conflict and the cognitive 
countermeasure on the distribution of visual 
fixations.
The mean percentage fixation time on the 
panoramic video was mainly considered during 
each segment, as it was hypothesized that the 
authority conflict would induce an excessive 
focus on this particular AOI. The number of 
scanned AOIs was also measured for each of the 
four segments. Similar to the principle of the 
HR measurement, we examined the gaze 
switching rate, which corresponded to the num-
ber of gaze transitions from AOI to AOI per 
minute for each of the four segments. As the 
cognitive countermeasure consisted of remov-
ing the panoramic video screen for 1 s, the very 
first saccade was analyzed after the triggering 
of the countermeasure.
Procedure
Participants sat in a comfortable chair placed 
1 m from the user interface in a closed room 
with no visual contact to the outdoor play-
ground where the robot evolved. The ECG 
electrodes were arranged on the participant’s 
chest, and the eye tracker was placed on his or 
her head. Next, participants completed a 
13-point eye tracker calibration and then had to 
rest for 3 min to determine their physiological 
baseline. The mission was explained and the 
user interface was detailed. The two guidance 
modes were presented with particular care 
given to the supervised mode. Participants were 
trained for 20 min to handle the robot through 
the panoramic video screen in the two guidance 
mode conditions.
Participants were told that four main hazards 
might occur during the mission. The associated 
procedure and the expected robot behavior were 
explained as following for each of these haz-
ards: For low-battery event, “let the robot go 
back to base in supervised mode immediately”; 
for communication breakdown or GPS loss, 
“wait for the communication or the GPS signal 
to come back and check the battery level to 
decide whether or not to abort the mission”; and 
for ultrasound sensor failure, “manually assist 
the robot to avoid obstacles.” The means to 
diagnose these four issues on the user interface 
were also explained: For low-battery event, 
“the battery icon turns to orange with an associ-
ated orange message, the mode changes to 
Supervised and is flashed twice, the segment of 
the mission becomes Back to base”; for com-
munication breakdown, “the user interface is 
frozen”; for GPS loss, “the GPS icon turns to 
red and the guidance mode changes to manual 
control”; and for ultrasound sensor failure, “the 
ultrasound icons turn to red.”
Participants were trained to detect and man-
age each situation once. After the briefing, we 
double-checked the participants’ understanding 
of the instructions and procedures. The timing 
was identical for the two groups, except that the 
cognitive countermeasure was sent simultane-
ously to the failure in the countermeasure group. 
After the experimentation, participants were 
asked whether they perceived the low-battery 
event and understood the robot’s behavior. 
Participants in the countermeasure group were 
also asked whether the cognitive countermea-
sure helped them to deal with the situation.
Statistical Analysis
All behavioral data were analyzed with 
Statistica 7.1 (StatSoft, Tulsa, OK, USA). 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test 
showed that data distribution was normal; there-
fore, parametric repeated-measures ANOVA and 
Fisher’s LSD (least significant difference) were 
used to examine the effects of the mission seg-
ment type on HR and the various oculometric 
measurements. We introduced a categorical 
explanatory variable in the analysis to check for 
differences between the two groups during S4 
and to uncover the countermeasure effect. 
The relationship between HR and visual ocular 
activity was analyzed with Bravais-Pearson cor-
relation.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Results of the control group revealed that 8 
participants out of 12 (67.67%) persisted in 
detecting the target instead of letting the robot 
go back to base. Although they felt surprised by 
the behavior of the robot, these participants all 
declared that they noticed neither the low-bat-
tery event nor the other changes on the user 
interface. The other 4 participants reported to 
 have rapidly noticed the failure and decided to 
let the robot go back to base.
In contrast, all of the 11 participants from the 
countermeasure group noticed the battery fail-
ure and understood the behavior of the robot. 
They reported that the cognitive countermea-
sure helped them deal with the problematic situ-
ation. In this group, 10 out of 11 participants 
made the decision to stop the mission and let the 
robot go back to base in supervised mode. Only 
one consciously persisted to identify the target 
for 50 s until the end of the experiment. That 
participant believed there remained enough 
power despite the occurrence of the battery 
failure.
Psychophysiological Results
Heart rate. Mean HR response is plotted in 
Figure 4 as a function of group and segment 
type. The two-way repeated-measures ANOVA 
showed a significant interaction between group 
and segment type, F(3, 63) = 6.19, p < .001, 
η2
p
 = .22. Whereas no group difference appeared 
during the three first segments, paired compari-
sons showed that mean HR change differed 
between the control group and the countermea-
sure group during S4 (p = .008), the segment 
containing the battery failure. In the control 
group, the battery failure generated an increased 
HR, whereas HR came back close to the 
baseline in the countermeasure group (+11.48 
beats per minute vs. +1.55 beats per minute, 
respectively).
Percentage of fixation duration on the pan-
oramic video. Figure 5 shows mean percentage 
of time spent on the panoramic video as a func-
tion of group and segment type. There was a 
significant interaction between group and seg-
ment type, F(3, 63) = 14.45, p < .001, η2
p
 = .40. 
Paired comparisons showed that the mean per-
centage of time spent on the panoramic video 
increased progressively during the three first 
segments within the two groups with no group 
difference (S1 < S2, p < .001; S1 < S3, p < .001; 
Figure 4. Mean heart rate change across the four mission segments for each group. Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean.
 S2 < S3, p < .001). On the contrary, during S4, 
the control and countermeasure groups differed 
(p < .001): Whereas the control group spent 
91.13% of time on the video during this seg-
ment, the countermeasure group spent only 
60.05% of time on the video. This latter result 
shows that the cognitive countermeasure was 
successful in reducing participants’ excessive 
focusing on the panoramic video.
Number of scanned AOIs. There was a sig-
nificant interaction between group and segment 
type, F(3, 63) = 12.11, p < .001, η2
p
 = .36. 
Paired comparisons showed that the number of 
scanned AOIs increased strongly from S3 to S4 
in the countermeasure group (p < .001), whereas 
this number remained stable in the control 
group. Coherently, the number of scanned AOIs 
was significantly higher within the countermea-
sure group (7.81) than in the control group 
(4.66) during S4 (p < .001). As for fixation 
duration, this latter result confirms that the cog-
nitive countermeasure helped the participants to 
redistribute their ocular activity toward other 
AOIs. See Figure 6.
Switching rate. The same analysis performed 
on the gaze switching rate (gaze transitions 
from AOI to AOI per min) also revealed a 
Group × Segment type interaction, F(3, 63) = 
18.30, p < .001, η2
p
 = .51). Whereas the transi-
tion rate fell progressively during the first three 
segments in both groups (S1 > S2, p < .001; 
S1 > S3, p < .001; S2 > S3, p = .005), during S4, 
the transition rate differed between the control 
group and the countermeasure group (p < .001). 
In this latter segment, the mean transition rate 
continued to diminish in the control group 
(–31.59%; S4 < S3, p = .033), whereas it 
increased drastically in the countermeasure 
group (+328.33%; S4 > S3, p < .001). This lat-
ter result confirms again that the countermea-
sure was efficient in stimulating the participant’s 
ocular shifting abilities. See Figure 7.
First saccade analysis following the cogni-
tive countermeasure. Finally, we examined the 
very first gazed AOI when the panoramic video 
screen was removed during the 1-s period of the 
cognitive countermeasure. Although all the par-
ticipants were focused on the panoramic video 
Figure 5. Mean percentage of time spent on the panoramic video according to the four segments for both 
groups. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
 Figure 6. Mean number of scanned areas of interest according to the four segments for both groups. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean.
Figure 7. Gaze switching rate according to the four segments for both groups. Error bars represent the standard 
error of the mean.
  
screen, this information removal led 81.82% of 
the participants to have saccadic activity from 
this AOI to another one within 1 s. Among these 
latter participants, 45.45% of them gazed at 
the battery gauge, 27.27% at the mission seg-
ment panel, and 9.09% at the tactical map—all 
key instruments to understand the automation 
behavior.
DISCUSSION
The main objective of this study was to deter-
mine the efficiency of a cognitive countermea-
sure to enhance participants’ attentional abilities 
when facing an authority conflict. A scenario 
was designed in the context of UGV operations 
whereby an authority conflict was induced by a 
low-battery event. The results of the control 
group revealed that such conflict provoked typi-
cal automation surprise behavior (Sarter et al., 
1997) that is associated with an attentional 
shrinking. In a similar way to Sarter et al.’s 
(2007) study, participants neglected rel-
evant information necessary for understanding 
the automation behavior. In contrast, the results 
of the countermeasure group revealed the benefi-
cial effects of information removal and its tem-
porary replacement with an explicit visual 
stimulus to change attentional focus during the 
automation conflict. Participants in this group 
exhibited reduced HR compared with those who 
did not receive the countermeasure, which may 
suggest a decreased level of stress (Simpson, 
Snyder, Gusnard, & Raichle, 2001) during the 
conflict.
Moreover, all participants who received the 
countermeasure perceived the failure, and all 
but one decided immediately to let the robot go 
back to base. The behavior of this latter partici-
pant, who decided deliberately to persist in 
identifying the target, may show some limits of 
the cognitive countermeasure procedure. This 
finding is consistent with a previous experiment 
conducted on a flight simulator in which 2 out 
of 13 pilots from a countermeasure group con-
sciously continued to land even though they 
were aware of the danger of such an action 
(Dehais et al., 2003).
The design of the cognitive countermeasure 
was grounded in Posner and Dehaene’s (1994) 
theory of attention. This innovative solution 
was in contrast to the classical trend of adding 
warning systems or increasing the saliency of 
alarms (Beringer & Harris, 1999). Although this 
traditional approach is effective in engaging 
and capturing attention (Bustamante, 2008), it 
may be counterproductive (Edworthy, 1993) 
by failing to disengage attention from 
the ongoing task. The present results suggest 
that for most participants of the countermeasure 
group, the principle of information removal was 
efficient enough to cause a saccade from the 
video panoramic to another AOI. Given that 
saccades reflect visual attentional processing 
(McCarley & Kramer, 2006), it may be argued 
that this rapid change of focus revealed 
an attentional disengagement induced by the 
countermeasure.
Engaging and maintaining attention on 
particular information, such as the video 
panoramic, relies on a tonic inhibition process 
(especially implemented in the pulvinar 
nucleus) to filter out distracting visual items 
(LaBerge, Carter, & Brown, 1992), especially 
during increased arousal (Tracy et al., 2000). By 
suppressing the panoramic video screen on 
which attention was locked, one could argue 
that the cognitive countermeasures contribute to 
releasing the inhibition process and to allowing 
a saccade toward another area.
In future experiments, we intend to demon-
strate that cognitive countermeasures can be 
efficient in helping human operators in cases 
when audio alerts have been neglected, as sug-
gested by preliminary results in the aeronautical 
domain (Dehais et al., 2010). These cognitive 
countermeasures could rely on classical visual 
information removal, but also “aural” cognitive 
countermeasures could also be considered. A 
study conducted by Meredith et al. (1995) 
suggests that simultaneous aural alerts can 
confuse human operators; as such, information 
removal could consist of inhibiting low-priority 
alerts until the high-priority goals have been 
achieved.
The present research was applied to the con-
text of human-UV interactions; however, the 
issues of attentional shrinking and the use of 
cognitive countermeasures go beyond the 
domain of UV operations. Indeed, these issues 
also apply to other critical systems, such 
as aviation, driving, and medicine, in which 
attentional tunneling is likely to appear (Cook 
& McDonald, 1988; Crundall, Underwood, & 
Chapman, 1999; Thomas & Wickens, 2004). 
The principle of cognitive countermeasures 
could be particularly suited to head-up displays 
(HUD) that are vulnerable to attentional tunnel-
ing (Thomas & Wickens, 2004; Wickens & 
Alexander, 2009); moreover, the principle of 
information removal would not be critical in 
this case, as the displayed information on the 
HUD is redundant.
Whatever the domain, the use of the cognitive 
countermeasures has to be considered as a last 
option when the other traditional alerts have 
proven to be inefficient. The use of the cognitive 
countermeasure has to be strictly limited to 
highly hazardous situations in which safety could 
be at risk, such as the threat of collision, errone-
ous fuel management, loss of control, or inappro-
priate vehicle configuration (e.g., landing gear). 
Removing information, even for a short period, 
could be critical for safety, and the decision to 
trigger a cognitive countermeasure has to be 
based on a reliable analysis of the context by for-
mal methods (Dehais, Mercier, & Tessier, 2009).
Research on adaptive systems (Wilson & 
Russell, 2007) could also provide interesting 
insights as they aim to infer the human operator’s 
cognitive state from different measurement 
techniques and then adapt the nature of the inter-
action to overcome cognitive bottlenecks (St. 
John, Kobus, Morrison, & Schmorrow, 2004). 
Regarding the measurements used in this study, 
the HR response appeared to be a relevant a pos-
teriori indicator of participants’ sympathetic 
activity induced by the task. Nevertheless, this 
metric faces limitations for predicting human 
operator behavior in a real-time perspective 
because it can be confounded by emotion 
(Causse, Sénard, Démonet, Pastor, 2010).
There is also considerable variability across 
individuals (Vila et al., 2007), and changes in 
the operator’s state can be difficult to detect 
within small time periods (Berntson, Quigley, 
& Lozano, 2007), which is necessary for adap-
tive systems (Scerbo, 2007).
In contrast, the ocular activity analysis 
appeared to be a reliable indicator of attentional 
impairment. Indeed, the proposed oculometric 
variables were efficient in identifying atten-
tional shrinking and assessing the effects of the 
cognitive countermeasure. Moreover, the eye 
tracking technique provides clues about not 
only the timing of attentional tunneling but also 
the location on the user interface on which it 
takes place. These indications could be used in 
an adaptive system perspective to decide when 
and where to remove information.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This work was funded by Direction Générale de 
l’Armement (DGA), Mission pour la Recherche et 
l’Innovation Scientifique (MRIS). We would like to 
express our sincere gratitude to D. Bazalgette (head of 
the Human Factor Department, DGA-MRIS) and Capt. 
E. Gardinetti (DGA) for their crucial support on this 
project; P. Chauvin, C. S. Tsan, and the DMIA 
for their great work on the experimental setup; and 
the participants who volunteered their time to complete 
this research. We also wish to thank François Vachon 
for helpful reviews and very relevant comments on 
the article and Helen Hodgetts for improving the 
spelling.
NOTE
1. The cognitive group originally consisted of 12 
participants, but technical issues regarding the eye 
tracking measurement on 1 participant led us to remove 
him from the analysis.
KEY POINTS
 • Conflict with automation might induce atten-
tional tunneling.
 • Cognitive countermeasures were designed to 
counter attentional tunneling.
 • The principle of cognitive countermeasures relied 
on the temporary removal of information and its 
replacement by an explicit stimulus in the visual 
field.
 • Behavioral and physiological measurements 
revealed the efficiency of cognitive countermea-
sures to mitigate attentional tunneling and to 
assist human operators.
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